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Alexander MORRISON
RUSSIA, KHOQAND, AND THE SEARCH FOR A 
“NATURAL” FRONTIER, 1863–1865*
“la plus grande difficulté consiste à savoir s’arrêter,” 
Prince A. M. Gorchakov, 1864 
The Russian conquest of Central Asia in the nineteenth century was seen 
by most onlookers as the act of an aggressive imperial power, hungry for 
territory, prestige, and the opportunity to threaten its British rivals in India, 
or – in what became the canonical interpretation in the Soviet period – for 
captive markets and sources of raw materials. Russia’s own statesmen were 
more inclined to present it as a process that got out of control, as the im-
mediate need to pacify troublesome tribes on the frontier combined with the 
actions of ambitious “men on the spot” to draw the empire into conquest 
after conquest, without any grand plan or strategy. The classic statement 
of this “reluctant imperialist” idea came from the Russian foreign minister 
Prince A. M. Gorchakov (1798–1883) in a minute circulated to the Foreign 
Ministries of all the European powers, in which, after comparing Russian 
expansion with that of other colonial powers, he remarked rather peevishly 
* The author acknowledges the criticism and suggestions of the anonymous reviewers 
of Ab Imperio on previous drafts of this article.
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the Russian military-bureaucratic episteme he identifies and the facts of hu-
man and physical geography in Central Asia itself that allowed seemingly 
uncontrolled expansion, and help to explain Gorchakov’s disclaimer. This 
article argues that the “man on the spot” – in this case preeminently Cher-
niaev – played an important role in determining the timing of the Russian 
advance, but not its overall form and direction. This was governed instead 
by the search for a “natural” frontier in the region.
I
On August 1, 1863, Gorchakov and the War Minister Dmitri Miliutin 
(1816–1912) jointly presented Tsar Alexander II with a proposal for the 
uniting of the Orenburg and Western Siberian lines of fortresses through 
the southern part of the Asian steppe between Fort Vernoe in the Trans-Ili 
region and Fort Perovskii on the Syr-Darya. This was the product of over 
four years of argument and wrangling between different ministries in St. 
Petersburg, and between the separate military commands of Orenburg 
and Omsk. Much of the debate had concerned the fate of the city of Tash-
kent, whose annexation had been urged by A. P. Bezak (1800–1868), the 
governor of Orenburg, and opposed by his opposite number in Western 
Siberia, A. O. Duhamel (1801–1880).5 For now though, at least, Tashkent 
had been left out of the official plans for the year ahead. Miliutin himself 
probably harbored long-term ambitions of anchoring the planned new 
Russian frontier on that city, a major trading entrepot and the center of a 
rich agricultural district, and there is no doubt that it continued to exercise 
a fascination for many “men on the spot” in the Russian military. How-
ever, the line of the Russian advance was to be determined by a process 
of objective verification based on the natural and human geography of 
the region. As Miliutin explained to Bezak a week later, after the tsar had 
approved the plan:
In uniting the line, and with the establishment of our frontier on 
the summit of the Qara-Tau, we are not broadening our frontiers, but 
on the contrary restricting their extent, and coming closer to the fertile 
regions of Central Asia.6 
5 On this debate, see Alexander Morrison. “Nechto Eroticheskoe”? “Courir après 
l’ombre”? Logistical Imperatives and the Fall of Tashkent, 1859–1865 // Central Asian 
Survey. 2014. Vol. 33. No. 2. Pp. 153-169.
6 Miliutin to Bezak, August 12, 1863 // Central State Archive of the Republic of Kazakh-
stan (TsGARKaz). F. 382. Op. 1. D. 47 (“O budushchikh deistviiakh nashikh v Srednei 
Azii”). L. 33ob-34ob.
that “the greatest difficulty consists in knowing how to stop.”1 This disavowal 
of all expansionist ambitions and abdication of responsibility looks wholly 
hypocritical in hindsight, and was viewed so at the time by the British, who 
were its principal intended audience. However, there is reason to believe that 
Gorchakov’s sentiments were sincerely felt. The Central Asian frontier had 
been a persistent headache for the Foreign Ministry since at least the 1830s, 
and most of the territory acquired there since that date was of very dubious 
strategic and economic value. Later historians have echoed the judgement that 
Russia’s “men on the spot” got out of control, and that many key episodes, most 
notably the capture of Tashkent by General M. G. Cherniaev (1828–1898) in 
June 1865, were indeed a product of “not knowing how to stop.”2 However, 
a reexamination of contemporary debates and correspondence reveals that 
this is an oversimplification. St. Petersburg did have a plan for expansion in 
Central Asia in the early 1860s, and ministers and frontline officers shared 
numerous assumptions about Russia’s role in Central Asia, the form its 
frontier there should take, and, above all, how a suitable, natural limit to 
Russian expansion could be identified. In principle, at least, new techniques 
of surveying, statistics, and military topography would make this possible, 
and in this, Russia shared in a wider European imperial military episteme 
and the formation of what James Hevia has called a “military techno-elite,” 
which emerged from the 1860s onward.3 As David Rich has noted in his 
study of the Russian General Staff, the group of officers who created and 
identified with this spirit of scientific military professionalism (which was 
still in its infancy in the 1860s): “Statistical knowledge empowered Russian 
state servants to act wilfully, yet from motives at once more self-serving and 
bureaucratically defensible than traditional arbitrariness (proizvol).” How-
ever, Rich goes on to argue that “Rogue Generals carved out new territories 
in Central Asia, either in the absence of unified national policy or oblivious 
to St. Petersburg’s commands to the contrary,”4 thus reproducing the conven-
tional “disobedience” thesis. In fact it was the incommensurability between 
1 “Circular dispatch addressed by Prince Gortchakow to Russian Representatives abroad.” 
November 21, 1864 // Parliamentary Papers. Central Asia. No. 2 (1873) [Correspondence 
Respecting Central Asia, C. 704:]. P. 70 (French original) – the contemporary English 
translation (P. 73) has “knowing when to stop,” but I think my rendering is more accurate.
2 David Mackenzie. Expansion in Central Asia: St. Petersburg vs. The Turkestan Generals 
(1863–1866) // Canadian Slavic Studies. 1969. Vol. 3. No. 2. Pp. 286-311.
3 James Hevia. The Imperial Security State. British Colonial Knowledge and Empire-
Building in Asia. Cambridge, 2012. Pp. 34-52.
4 David Alan Rich. The Tsar’s Colonels. Professionalism, Strategy, and Subversion in 
Late Imperial Russia. Cambridge, MA., 1998. Pp. 6, 91.
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Central Asian steppe. Unlike the later creation of the Russian boundary 
with Afghanistan, (which was equally driven by the idea of identifying 
a “natural” frontier that could be scientifically fixed),10 there would be 
no European partner to this early Russian attempt at boundary making in 
Central Asia – and the Russians did not admit the legitimacy of any Central 
Asian participation in this enterprise.
By the late 1850s, Russian surveyors – notably A. G. Vlangali, M. M. 
Khomentov, and, most famously, P. P. Semenov Tian-Shanskii and Choqan 
Valikhanov, had surveyed and mapped much of the Ili Valley and parts of 
the Tian Shan range in Southern Semirechie.11 However, the region between 
Fort Vernoe and the Qara-Tau range remained terra incognita as the leader-
ship in St. Petersburg began to consider renewing the Russian advance in 
Central Asia in the early 1860s. In 1859 the military geographer Mikhail 
Veniukov (1832–1901) carried out a crucial survey of what the Russians 
called the “Khoqand military line” – a string of fortresses built by the 
khanate in the valley of the River Chu (Toqmaq, Pishpek, Aq-Su, Merke, 
It-kichu, Aulie-Ata, Chulaq-Qurghan, and Suzaq). These he interpreted as 
designed to defend a frontier “that the Khoqandis evidently consider to be 
the River Chu.”12 Veniukov was the leading Russian military geographer 
of his day, and a strong proponent of the idea of the “natural frontier.” His 
description here of a frontier defined by a river, and by the summits of 
the Qyzykurt, Buraldai, Qara-Tau, and Ala-Tau mountains, would prove 
highly influential in determining the pattern of the Russian advance, and the 
natural features on which statesmen in St. Petersburg would try to anchor 
the Russians’ own “New Khoqand Line” in the mid-1860s.13 In his later 
published works, Veniukov noted that, with the exception of agreements 
with China, over the previous 300 years the Russians had never concluded 
any treaties in Asia that established firm boundaries; this was despite the 
fact, so he claimed, that the “state border” (gosudarstvennaia granitsa) had 
been extended far to the south by the submission of the Qazaqs of the Junior 
10 Hevia. Imperial Security State. Pp. 92-105.
11 Postnikov. Stanovlenie rubezhei. Pp. 228-234; P. P. Semenov. Travels in the Tian’-Shan’ 
1856–1857 / Ed. and trans. Colin Thomas, Liudmila Gilmour, and Marcus Wheeler. 
London, 1998.
12 Kokandskaia voennaia liniia na r. Chu 15/07/1860 // RGVIA. F.1449. Op. 1. D. 7. L. 
2; see further Janet Kilian. Allies & Adversaries: The Russian Conquest of the Kazakh 
Steppe / Ph.D. Dissertation; George Washington University, 2013. Pp. 287-289.
13 He published a version of his report the following year: Mikhail Veniukov. Ocherki Zai-
liiskogo kraia i Prichuiskoi strany // Izvestiia Imperatorskogo Russkogo Geograficheskogo 
Obshchestva. 1861. No. 4. Pp. 79-116. See further Rich. The Tsar’s Colonels. P. 62.
Miliutin’s confident assertion that the new Russian frontier could sit 
comfortably on the summit of the Qara-Tau (a mountain range that he had 
never seen, and about whose location and characteristics the Russians, as we 
shall see, had little accurate knowledge) was entirely characteristic of Rus-
sian thinking regarding frontiers in Central Asia in this period, and reflected 
wider European attitudes. As Alexei Postnikov and Svetlana Gorshenina have 
shown, rather than acknowledging that frontiers were something imposed 
on the landscape according to the dictates of political expediency and raw 
military power, officials and statesmen preferred to believe that they were 
something that could and should be determined according to objective cri-
teria that could be identified in the landscape.7 These included prominent 
geographical features such as rivers and watersheds, and also notional hu-
man “civilizational” boundaries, such as those between the steppe and the 
sown in Central Asia. In 1864 Gorchakov wrote:
[N]omad tribes, which can neither be seized nor punished nor ef-
fectually kept in order, are our most inconvenient neighbors; while, 
on the other hand, agricultural and commercial populations attached 
to the soil, and possessing a more advanced social organization, offer 
us every chance of gaining neighbors with whom there is a possibil-
ity of entering into relations. Consequently, our frontier line ought to 
swallow up the former, and stop short at the limit of the latter. These 
… principles supply a clear, natural, and logical explanation of our 
last military operations in Central Asia.8
Existing political arrangements, such as the Khoqand khanate’s control 
of a large swathe of the southern steppe from its agricultural base in the 
Ferghana Valley, or the ambitions of the ruler of Bukhara, Amir Sayyid 
Muzaffar, to control Tashkent himself, were either ignored or seen as 
inherently illegitimate. Instead, the science of military geography would 
allow the Russians to establish a “frontier” that emerged from the landscape 
and would allow them to “obtain a firm state border” (poluchit’ tverduiu 
gosudarstvennuiu granitsu, in the words of G. K. Gasfort, governor of 
Western Siberia in 1859)9 in the apparently boundless (and boundary-less) 
7 Svetlana Gorshenina. Asie Centrale. L’invention des frontières et l’héritage russo-
soviétique. Paris, 2012. Pp. 37-93; A. V. Postnikov. Stanovlenie rubezhei Rossii v 
Tsentral’noi i Srednei Azii (XVIII–XIXvv). Moscow, 2007. 
8 Circular dispatch addressed by Prince Gortchakow. P. 74.
9 Zapiska Komandira Otdel’nogo Sibirskogo Korpusa i General-Gubernatora Zapadnoi 
Sibiri o neobkhodimosti zaniatiia verkhov’ev r. Chu i predvaritel’nykh k tomu raspo-
ryazheniyam 21/01/1859 // Russian State Military Historic Archive (RGVIA). F. 483. 
Op. 1. D. 51. L. 4-5ob.
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the Senior zhuz,18 whose grazing grounds stretched far to the north of the 
line defined by Veniukov.19 
II
Before Russian troops began to advance west from Vernoe and south 
from Perovsk in 1863, a notional, “natural” frontier that would finally set 
limits to the empire’s expansion in Central Asia had been indicated in the 
orders issued to their commanders. Shortly before he set out on a recon-
naissance mission toward the small Khoqandi fortress of Suzaq early in 
1863, Cherniaev wrote that to properly secure the left flank of the Russian 
frontier, the following would be necessary: “The taking of Turkestan and 
18 Usually translated as “horde,” although literally it means “hundred” – one of the three 
political divisions that had emerged among the Qazaqs by the mid-seventeenth century. 
The others were the Middle and Junior Zhuzes.
19 In this article, I use a Khoqandi account of the Russian conquest as a counterpoint 
to Russian sources: Timur Beisembiev. The Life of ‘Alimqul. A Native Chronicle of 
Nineteenth-Century Central Asia. London, 2003, a magnificent edition of Mullah Mu-
hammad Yunus Jan Shighavul Tashkandi’s Ta’rikh-i ‘Aliquli Amir-i Lashkar (ca.1901–6, 
hereafter cited as TA); all quotations are from Beisembiev’s English translation. Another 
important text is Nikolai Pantusov. Taarikh Shakhrokhi. Istoriia Vladetelei Fergany. Ka-
zan’, 1885), an obsolete nineteenth-century edition of Mullah Niyaz Khoqandi Ta’rikh-i 
Shahrukhi (1871, hereafter cited as TS), which needs to be read in conjunction with T. 
K. Beisembiev. Tarikhi Shakhrukhi kak istoricheskii istochnik. Alma-Ata, 1982). See 
further T. K. Beisembiev. Annotated Indices to the Khoqand Chronicles. Tokyo, 2008.
and Middle Zhuzes to Russia in 1732 (an interpretation that would become 
canonical in the Soviet period), even though in many respects (such as the 
customs boundary) it remained a foreign (zagranichnyi) territory until the 
1860s.14 He considered this situation to be anomalous, unacceptable, and 
ripe for revision.
The main culprit in the creation of this zone of uncertainty in the steppe 
was the Khoqand Khanate, an aggressive, ambitious, expansionist rival 
to Russia in what its own historians referred to as the Dasht-i Qipchaq. 
Between 1808, when Tashkent fell to Khoqandi forces, and 1834, when 
a Chitrali mercenary named Lashkar Qushbegi established the fortress of 
Aq Masjid on the lower Syr-Darya, Khoqand expanded to become a major 
steppe power, collecting zakat15 from Qazaq nomads over whom Russia 
claimed sovereignty and, so the Russians claimed, disrupting caravan routes 
and generally disturbing the peace.16 Most frustrating of all was the fact that 
Khoqand did not appear to the Russians to have a clearly defined northern 
frontier, although there is some evidence to suggest that the Khanate’s own 
leaders thought otherwise. In 1854, in the aftermath of the fall of Aq Masjid 
to the Russians and its renaming as “Fort Perovskii,” a Khoqandi ambassador 
to the East India Company stated that “The boundary between Kokan and 
Russia was previously Kizzilpir – now it is Ak-musjid” although he added 
that “I do not know whether Kizzilpir is on the East or West bank of the Sir 
[Darya].”17 While this suggests a territorial understanding of sovereignty, 
this particular account has been mediated through British eyes: as we shall 
see, evidence from other Khoqandi sources suggests that the khanate’s elites 
thought primarily in terms of control over people rather than territory: at 
the very least, though, Khoqand claimed sovereignty over the Qazaqs of 
14 Mikhail Veniukov. Opyt voennogo obozreniia russkikh granits v Azii. St. Peterburg, 
1873. Pp. 6, 10.
15 The tax on commerce under Islamic law, usually equivalent to 1/40th of the value of 
the goods.
16 Scott Levi. The Ferghana Valley at the Crossroads of World History: The Rise of 
Khoqand 1709–1822 // Journal of Global History. 2007. Vol. 2. No. 2. Pp. 213-232; 
T. K. Beisembiev. Vysshaia administratsiia Tashkenta i iuga Kazakhstana v period Kho-
qandskogo Khanstva: 1809–1865 // Istoriko-kul’turnye vzaimosviazi Irana i Dasht-i 
Kipchaka v XIII–XVIII vv. Almaty, 2004. Pp. 291-313; B. M. Babadzhanov. Khoqandskoe 
Khanstvo: vlast’, politika, religiia. Tokyo and Tashkent, 2010. 
17 Deposition of Moollah Yar Mahomed, servant of the Padshah or Khan of Kokan, 
made to Major Edwardes at Peshawur 18th August 1854 // National Archives of India. 
Foreign/S.C./24th November 1854/Nos. 1-22 Account of the Khanate of Khoqand. 
P. 11.
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“the War Minister, agreeing entirely with my opinion on the uselessness of 
dispatching any expedition against the Khoqandis without a defined goal, 
especially in winter, and on the necessity of the rapid uniting of our forward 
lines, considers the line through Suzaq and Aulie-Ata only temporary.”24 It 
would be “transferred” (an interesting euphemism for an action that would 
require the conquest of significant further territory) at some unspecified later 
date to a supposedly equally “natural” frontier along the River Arys. As we 
shall see, this ambiguity, combined with the fact that these orders related 
to a landscape that none of the men concerned had actually seen, would in 
practice allow Cherniaev considerable latitude to interpret his orders as he 
saw fit, in the assurance that (as in the past) as long as they were victorious, 
his actions would be retrospectively endorsed.
In the discussions as to where the Siberian section of the new line should 
run, natural landmarks did not play a prominent role, but human and natural 
environmental conditions did. G. A. Kolpakovskii, the Pristav of the Ala-
Tau region (and soon to be governor of the new province of Semirechie) 
emphasized the need for fortified points at Merke, Toqmaq, and Pishpek 
in order to defend caravan traffic and prevent baramta (livestock raiding), 
noting also that these regions were suitable for settlement and asking that 
200 families of Cossacks be sent there. The main concern, here as in the 
earlier debates over the desirability of seizing Tashkent, was the importance 
of having a frontier line that ran through a region with a sedentary popula-
tion, and thus good supplies of grain and timber. He argued that the supply 
road for the frontier should run along the Kastek valley because it had good 
grazing for baggage animals even at the end of summer.25 On the Orenburg 
side of the debate, the considerations were more abstract, but Bezak was 
consistently hawkish, and advocated seizing the sacred town of Turkestan, 
site of the mausoleum of Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi,26 at the earliest possible 
opportunity. He claimed that:
Not that long ago the expanse dividing the Orenburg line from the 
Siberian was entirely unknown to us, and our information beyond Fort 
24 Bezak to Duhamel, January 12, 1864 // Ibid. Doc. 5. P. 7.
25 Kolpakovskii to Duhame, February 22, 1864 // Ibid. Doc. 14. Pp. 25-27.
26 A twelfth-century saint, founder of the Yasawiyya Sufi tariqa. In the nineteenth 
century, his mausoleum in Turkestan remained an important center of pilgrimage, and 
a focus for numerous sacred lineages. See Devin DeWeese. The Masha’ikh-i Turk and 
the Khojagan // Journal of Islamic Studies. 1996. Vol. 7. No. 2. Pp. 180-207; Idem. 
The Politics of Sacred Lineages in 19th Century Central Asia // International Journal of 
Middle-East Studies. 1999. Vol. 31. No. 4. Pp. 507-530.
the continuation of the line along the Ala-Tau mountains to be united with 
the Siberian frontier, and the introduction of military settlements along the 
Syr.”20 Cherniaev made the first step toward this shortly afterward by captur-
ing Suzaq almost without a fight, a success that, retrospectively authorized 
by the War Ministry, finally persuaded the more cautious Gorchakov to ac-
cept Miliutin’s argument that the uniting of the lines and the creation of a 
new frontier should take place without further delay.21 A note from Miliutin 
to the Foreign Ministry in January 1864 laid out the objectives in Central 
Asia for the coming year. Chief among these was
the uniting of the forward Siberian and Orenburg lines, on the basis 
proposed by General-Adjutant Bezak, that is, from Djulek along the 
Syr-Darya, through Suzaq, to Aulie-Ata and further along the summit 
of the Qara-Tau mountains, having taken Suzaq with the forces of 
the Orenburg corps and Aulie-Ata with those of the Siberian corps, 
in order to then transfer the border to the [River] Arys, taking it from 
Aulie-Ata through Chimkent.22
This combination of urban and natural landmarks that would define the 
new frontier was reproduced verbatim in the orders issued in March by 
General Duhamel to Cherniaev, who had been reassigned from the Orenburg 
to the Siberian command personally by Miliutin a few days later.23 From 
the beginning, however, these orders contained a significant ambiguity – 
there was to be an initial “natural” frontier between Suzaq and Aulie-Ata 
along the summit of the Qara-Tau, but as Bezak wrote to Duhamel in Omsk 
20 M. G. Cherniaev. O vodvorenii spokoistviia v nashikh granitsakh. Napisano do 63g. 
// Russian State Historical Museum. Division of Written Sources (RGIMOPI). F. 208. 
Op. 1. D. 4. L. 70.
21 Ivanov’s suggestion that this approval was owing to a desire to punish the British 
for their interference in the Polish revolt that year seems to be entirely without foun-
dation – the correspondence reveals that Miliutin’s overwhelming concern was for a 
sustainable and defensible frontier in Central Asia: V. A. Ivanov. Rossiia i Turkestan v 
kontekste Bol’shoi Igry // Rossiia–Sredniaia Aziia. 2011. Vol. 1. P. 105. See Morrison. 
“Nechto Eroticheskoe”. Pp. 164-165. See also Kilian. Allies & Adversaries. Pp. 331-332, 
though she gives too much credence to Khalfin’s argument that this was motivated by 
commercial considerations (N. A. Khalfin. Politika Rossii v Srednei Azii (1857–1868). 
Moscow, 1960. Pp. 161-163.
22 Miliutin to Reutern, January 9, 1864 // A. G. Serebrennikov. Turkestanskii Krai: Sbornik 
Materialov dlia istorii ego zavoevaniia. Tashkent, 1914. Vol. 17 (1864 g.). Part 1. Doc. 
45. Pp. 81-82; M. A. Terent’ev. Istoriia Zavoevaniia Srednei Azii. St. Petersburg, 1906. 
Vol. 1. P. 276.
23 Miliutin to Duhamel, January 12, 1864; Duhamel to Cherniaev, March 3, 1864 // Sere-
brennikov. Turkestanskii Krai: Sbornik. Vol. 17 (1864 g.). Part. 1. Doc. 2 & 6. Pp. 4, 7-8.
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days later on May 1.31 Cherniaev’s forces encountered no opposition at 
Merke, Toqmaq, or Pishpek; they reached Aulie-Ata on June 2, and after a 
brief siege stormed the fortified town on the fourth. Cherniaev wrote to his 
father on the sixth that “before you receive this letter you will no doubt have 
heard from the newspapers of my capture of Aulie-Ata, which is the final 
goal proposed for the force’s activities this year…the capture of the fortress 
hardly cost us any losses, thanks to the constant rain, which prevented the 
Khoqandis from using their matchlocks’ (emphasis added).32 Apart from 
offering further evidence of the advantages in military technology enjoyed 
by the Russians during the conquest of Central Asia, this letter suggests 
that at this stage, at least, Cherniaev understood his orders to have been 
fulfilled – the further “transfer” of the frontier to the Arys was not to hap-
pen that year. On June 12, Verevkin’s forces captured Turkestan. The new 
Russian frontier had ostensibly been created as planned, however, barely a 
month later Cherniaev would be advancing on Chimkent. This would appear 
to offer confirmation of Mackenzie’s “disobedience” thesis in explaining this 
phase of the Russian advance into Central Asia, but other factors were also 
at work.33 Terent’ev explained it in the following terms: “a closer acquain-
tance with the projected frontier revealed that the Qara-Tau range, which 
served as the actual frontier, in no way facilitated things, as communications 
between the forces and their furnishing with supplies were extremely dif-
ficult, and the northern slopes of the range, on top of this, were very short 
of water.”34 Communications across the Qara-Tau range would certainly 
not have been easy, and the Russians seem to have underestimated the ob-
stacle it represented. The region between Aulie-Ata and Turkestan was not 
covered in Veniukov’s survey, and instead the Russians found themselves 
reliant on information from local sources.35 In all probability the sum total 
31 Terent’ev. Istoriia Zavoevaniia. Pp. 268-269.
32 M. G. Cherniaev to Grigorii Nikitich Cherniaev, June 27, 1864 Aulie-Ata // International 
Institute for Social History, Amsterdam: Archief M. G. Cernjaev Folder 17; Kilian notes 
that Cherniaev sent back over 200 Khoqandi prisoners to Vernoe, most of whom were 
apparently over the age of 60. Kilian. Allies & Adversaries. P. 340.
33 David Mackenzie. The Lion of Tashkent. The Career of General M. G. Cherniaev. 
Athens, GA, 1974. P. 38.
34 Terent’ev. Istoriia Zavoevaniia. Vol. I. P. 278.
35 This offers strong parallels with the British use of indigenous networks and forms of 
information during their conquest of India, although, at least within the subcontinent, 
their ability to tap these seems to have been greater than that of the Russians in Central 
Asia. See C. A. Bayly. Empire and Information. Intelligence Gathering and Social Com-
munication in India, 1780–1870. Cambridge, 1996. Pp. 56-96.
Perovskii was limited to a radius of no more than 100 versts. Now we, 
with a sufficient knowledge of the area, are progressing quickly toward 
the goal laid out by His Imperial Majesty Nikolai Pavlovich, that is, to 
the uniting there of our frontier. ... controlling Turkestan is beneficial to 
us in the highest degree, as the central spot for the administration once 
the Orenburg and Siberian Lines are united ... we will be throwing the 
Khoqandis back across the River Arys.27
As we shall see, Bezak’s claims for the improvement of Russian geo-
graphical knowledge of the region turned out to be misplaced, but his 
representations had their effect, resulting in a further set of ambiguous 
instructions, this time to be passed on to the commander of the Orenburg 
forces in the region, Colonel Verevkin. After consulting with the tsar, N. P. 
Ignat’ev, the new head of the Asian section of the Foreign Ministry, wrote 
that “Colonel Verevkin is permitted to make use of favorable circumstances 
for the taking of Turkestan, without losing sight of the main aim of this 
military action – the factual uniting of the Orenburg and Siberian forward 
lines.”28 Milutin passed this message on in slightly different, but no less 
ambiguous terms:
I am permitted on the Highest authority to reply, that the plan of 
action that was resolved upon this summer should not be altered; ... 
the advance toward Turkestan can be undertaken only when a real and 
easy opportunity presents itself for seizing this point with a permanent 
garrison. A simple demonstration toward or bombardment of this city 
would be more dangerous than useful.29
The decision over when to take a crucial further step into Central Asia 
was effectively left to the discretion of the “man on the spot,” but with tacit 
authorization from the very highest levels of government.
In April 1864, Miliutin once again reminded Bezak that “The new 
frontier line, which will initially run along the Qara-Tau summit, will then, 
when the time is favorable, be moved, as your Excellency knows, to the 
Arys, from Aulie-Ata to Chimkent and Turkestan, and then to Suzaq.”30 
There was no indication of how it would be decided when the time was 
“favorable,” but the 2,500 troops, 800 horses, and 4,000 camels of Cher-
niaev’s Trans-Chu force set out from Fort Vernoe on their campaign ten 
27 Bezak to Miliutin, April 4, 1864 // Serebrennikov. Turkestanskii Krai: Sbornik. Vol. 
17 (1864 g.). Part. 1. Doc. 53. Pp. 95, 97.
28 Ignat’ev to Miliutin, April 4, 1864 // Ibid. Doc. 59. P. 105.
29 Resolution by D. A. Miliutin n.d. // Ibid. Doc. 53. P. 98.
30 Miliutin to Bezak, April 19, 1864 // Ibid. Doc. 62. P. 107.
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by Colonel V.  A. Poltoratskii of the Asiatic section of the General Staff 
(a personal friend of Cherniaev), who wrote that the purpose of the cam-
paigns was: “To create from the fortresses of Perovskii, Djulek, Turkestan, 
Chimkent, Aulie-ata, Merke, and Toqmaq a new forward Khoqand Line, 
the center of administration of which, depending on local circumstances, 
should be Aulie-Ata or Chimkent.”41 On July 17, Miliutin appointed Cher-
niaev commander of this “New Khoqand Line,” subordinating Verevkin 
to his authority on the grounds of seniority, although neither officer was 
yet aware of this. Instead the Chimkent campaign brought into stark relief 
the dangers of a divided command on the new frontier. Despite his abrupt 
dismissal of Cherniaev’s proposal to attack Chimkent, Verevkin shortly 
afterward dispatched a small force of two companies of infantry, a sotnia of 
Cossacks, twenty Kazakh auxiliaries, three guns, and a rocket battery under 
Staff-Captain Meyer from Turkestan across the Arys. Whether, as Cherniaev 
(and later Terent’ev) would allege, this was with the explicit aim of gaining 
the glory of capturing Chimkent for Orenburg before the Siberian troops 
could reach it, or it was simply intended to secure communications between 
the forces and Meyer exceeded his orders, he advanced directly toward 
Chimkent without alerting Cherniaev to his presence, and managed to get 
himself cut off and surrounded in the valley of Aq Bulaq by a much larger 
Khoqandi force led by Mullah ‘Alimqul himself.42 In Terent’ev’s account, 
Meyer only managed to extricate himself at the price of a deceitful and 
humiliating promise to return Turkestan to the Khoqandis, which was then, 
of course, reneged upon when Cherniaev appeared with reinforcements and 
scattered the Khoqandi troops.43 Curiously, none of the available Khoqandi 
sources mentions this offer, although ‘Alimqul appears to refer to it in an 
undated letter preserved by Serebrennikov in Russian translation.44 Mullah 
Muhammad Yunus describes negotiations between the Khoqandis and the 
Russians beginning only after Meyer and his men had been relieved by the 
arrival of Cherniaev and his men from Aulie-Ata. His account of the con-
versation with the Russian envoy (the naturalist N. A. Severtsov, who had 
41 Zapiska polkovnika Poltoratskogo ob obrazovanii peredovoi Kokandskoi Linii, July 
9, 1864 // Ibid. Doc. 132. P. 220.
42 Terent’ev. Istoriia Zavoevaniia. Vol. I. P. 284; Ta’rikh-i ‘Aliquli Amir-i Lashkar/ trans. 
P. 65, text 71b-72a.
43 Ibid. Pp. 288-289.
44 Beisembiev. Tarikhi Shakhrukhi. P.127; Ta’rikh-i Shahrukhi. P. 269; Bartol’d. Tuzemets 
o Russkom zavoevanii. P. 344; ‘Alimqul to Cherniaev 1864 // Serebrennikov. Turkestan-
skii Krai: Sbornik. Vol. 17 (1864 g.). Part. 2. Docs. 406 & 407. Pp. 295-296.
of Cherniaev’s knowledge of the landscape comprised a rough sketch-map 
drawn up by a Qazaq lazutchik (scout) for Kolpakovskii at the beginning 
of 1864, which only gave brief descriptions of routes and distances, and 
the barest outline of the landscape and rivers.36 What this map did indicate, 
however, was that the only road linking Aulie-Ata and Turkestan ran through 
Chimkent, which was still controlled by Khoqand. In his later memoirs, 
Miliutin gave this as the key reason for Cherniaev’s decision to advance on 
Chimkent, and approved his reasoning.37 When Cherniaev received intel-
ligence (which turned out to be correct) that a large Khoqandi force was 
massing at Chimkent that would sever communications between him and 
Verevkin, he made the decision to capture the city, and wrote to Verevkin 
for assistance. This resulted in a famously ill-tempered response from the 
latter, which Cherniaev would later reproduce (in somewhat altered form) 
in one of the many self-justifying publications of his retirement:38
If the purpose of your proposed advance to Chimkent is simply a 
reconnaissance of the Khoqandi forces, then it seems that this aim is 
already fulfilling itself. If you propose to capture Chimkent, with the 
purpose of its permanent occupation, then, without denying the ease 
and usefulness of such an enterprise, I must insist that not only the 
actual siege but also the creation and supply of a garrison there must 
fall solely on the Siberian, and in no way on the Orenburg forces. As 
Chimkent lies forty versts to the East of the left bank of the Arys, it 
does not enter at all into our proposed frontier and lies entirely outside 
the Syr-Darya region.39
Verevkin also wrote to Bezak a few days later to insist on the same 
point.40 Verevkin’s assertion that Chimkent did not fall into Russian plans 
for the frontier might be taken as confirmation that Cherniaev was acting 
entirely on his own initiative in attacking it, but this was not entirely true: 
after all, Chimkent had been mentioned by Miliutin as the anchoring-point 
of the new frontier in the original orders he issued in January 1864. A few 
days after Cherniaev set out toward Chimkent, this would be reconfirmed 
36 Map by ‘Abd al-Vali Qarabai oghli, January 19, 1864 // TsGARKaz. F.3. Op.1. D.167. 
Ll.114ob-115.
37 D. A. Miliutin. Vospominaniia 1863-4 / Ed. L. G. Zakharova. Moscow, 2003. P. 515.
38 M. G. Cherniaev. Sultany Kenesary i Sadyk // Russkii Vestnik. 1889. No. 8. Pp. 27-39; 
Terent’ev. Istoriia Zavoevaniia. Vol. I. P. 283.
39 Verevkin to Cherniaev, June 2, 1864; July 2, 1864 // Serebrennikov. Turkestanskii Krai: 
Sbornik. Vol. 17 (1864 g.). Part. 1. Docs. 88, 121. Pp. 144, 203.
40 Verevkin to Bezak, July 8, 1864 // Ibid. Doc. 131. P. 217.
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for not advancing more quickly to assist Meyer, and gave no credence to 
the idea that the latter had advanced without informing the Siberian forces 
in order to have the glory of taking Chimkent for himself.49 In his private 
papers, Cherniaev kept a copy of a resolution from Miliutin complaining 
of Cherniaev’s insolence in writing a letter to his friend Poltoratskii claim-
ing that his achievement in capturing Aulie-Ata had been insufficiently 
recognized. Miliutin was clearly very put out at Cherniaev’s (entirely char-
acteristic) self-importance and self-pity. In the same letter he went on to 
express apprehension at Cherniaev’s apparent intention of seizing Chimkent, 
stating that “such an expansion of our frontiers never entered into our plans; 
it entirely stretches our line and demands a significant increase in forces,” 
but regretting that communications were so slow that it was unlikely any 
countermanding order would reach Cherniaev in time.50 While Cherniaev 
had not received explicit orders to take Chimkent, Miliutin was being a little 
selective here: in fact, as we have seen, Chimkent was envisaged as a key 
point on the “New Khoqand Line” – something stated in the orders Mili-
utin had issued in January 1864, which had been passed on to Cherniaev in 
March.51 Cherniaev was guilty not of “expanding the frontier” per se, but 
of doing so to an accelerated timetable: he took advantage of the vagueness 
and ambiguity of St. Petersburg’s vision of where the frontier should run, 
no doubt encouraged by the fact that the last time he had done this, when 
capturing Suzaq in 1863, he had been heartily congratulated on his initiative, 
which had helped Miliutin stir the Foreign Ministry into action. 
If Miliutin was now turning against him, Cherniaev still had support 
from his immediate superior, Duhamel, who accepted his argument that 
Chimkent’s garrison posed an unacceptable threat to Russian communica-
tions. The next document in the sequence of Cherniaev’s private papers 
(which were clearly collected both as a record of his numerous vendettas 
and as an exercise in personal exoneration) was a series of notes excerpted 
from a letter from Duhamel to Miliutin on the necessity of taking Chimkent 
to prevent the Khoqandis from rupturing communications between Aulie-
Ata and Turkestan, evidently intended as proof that his conduct was both 
49 Miliutin. Vospominaniia 1863–4. P. 516.
50 Kopiia s rezoliutsii Voennogo Ministra na pis’mo General-Maiora Cherniaeva, pris-
lannoe Polkovniku Poltoratskomu 18 Avgusta 1864g // RGIM OPI. F. 208. Op. 1. D. 
6. L.10-ob.
51 This point has also been noted by Matthew Jamison. Weakness, Expansion and 
“Disobedience”: The Beginnings of Russian Expansion into the Heart of Central Asia, 
1864–1865 / PhD thesis; University of Oxford, 2007. P. 139.
spent a month as a prisoner of the Khoqandi Bek of Turkestan in 1858),45 
offers some insight into Khoqandi thinking on the question of frontiers:
If his Majesty the Emperor orders: “Leave Aq Masjid”, I shall even 
restore the destroyed walls of Aq Masjid and deliver it to you. But if 
he says: “Let that side of Arys belong to the Muslims and this [side] 
to the Russians”, we will act in accordance with this [order]. This 
proposal was very good and favourable [for us]. But the late Amir-i 
Lashkar thought: In the event that the town of Turkistan’s side of the 
Arys passes to the Russians, the tribe Besh-Tamghalik will slip out 
of our hands. Therefore such a favourable opportunity was missed.46
In other words, ‘Alimqul was reasoning not in terms of territory, but of 
people: with the benefit of hindsight Mullah Muhammad Yunus saw this as 
a missed opportunity to keep the Russians on the other side of the Arys, and 
thus perhaps preserve Tashkent and Khoqand’s core territories in Ferghana, 
which by the time he was writing had been under Russian rule for almost 
thirty years. Terent’ev’s account instead has Cherniaev stating that he did 
not have authority to negotiate terms, and that all he could do was halt 
military operations while the Khoqandis dispatched an embassy to Russia, 
while Severtsev was given the delicate task of explaining that Meyer’s offer 
of Turkestan had been a “misunderstanding.”47 Even assuming that Mullah 
Muhammad Yunus’s memory of the conversation is accurate, it is unlikely 
that any such agreement would have been kept by the Russians, who were 
about to discover that the Arys was most unsatisfactory as a “natural” frontier. 
III
After relieving Meyer and his men Cherniaev had made a “reconnais-
sance” (actually an attempted demonstration of force) before the citadel of 
Chimkent on July 19–22, during which his troops easily beat off another 
frontal assault, killing the Khoqandi commander Ming Bai Parvanachi, but 
did not attempt to take the citadel.48 Although Cherniaev was probably not 
to blame for the debacle at Aq Bulaq and before Chimkent, it seems that it 
was at this point that he began to lose the confidence of his superiors in St. 
Petersburg, Orenburg, and Omsk. In his memoirs Miliutin blamed Cherniaev 
45 Account of Jukulbai Andeev, April 27, 1858 // TsGARKaz. F. 383. Op. 1. D. 87 
(“Perepiska o zakhvate v plen magistra zoologii Severtseva”). L.1-2; N. A. Severtsev. 
Mesiats Plena u Kokantsev. St. Petersburg, 1860.
46 Ta’rikh-i ‘Aliquli Amir-i Lashkar / Trans. P. 66, text ff.73a-b.
47 Terent’ev. Istoriia Zavoevaniia. Vol. 1. P. 289.
48 Ta’rikh-i Shahrukhi. P. 270; Bartol’d. Tuzemets o russkom zavoevanii. P. 345. 
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2. A line along the Syr-Darya to the junction with the River Arys, up the 
course of this river to Aulie-Ata and along the northern face of the Ala-Tau 
to Kastek and Vernoe. This was considered better, not least because the Rus-
sians still believed the Arys was navigable. The renunciation of Chimkent 
and the failure to include Lake Issyk-Qul were considered serious drawbacks.
3. To permanently annex Chimkent, and make Tashkent a client state un-
der Russian protection. This was thought to carry too many risks of sucking 
Russia deep into Central Asia, and leaving its position in the region unclear.
4. To permanently annex Tashkent. This would solve supply problems 
and bring trade benefits, but would be a complex undertaking in the region 
“the Russification (obrusenie) of the region and its civil administration would 
be, if not completely impossible, extremely difficult.”57
Miliutin’s response to this was illuminating in more ways than one, re-
vealing both the continued belief that a “natural” limit could be placed on 
Russian expansion in the region, and an acknowledgment that this process 
could not be controlled from St. Petersburg:
I approve the attached note. I would propose to make just one 
alteration: the River Arys cannot itself serve as a border, as beyond it 
lies Chimkent, already taken by our forces and constituting a forward 
point that is very beneficial for the enclosing of the whole expanse 
behind it.
Because of this it seems to me, that the River Arys can serve only 
as an indication (ukazanie) of the direction of our forward line, and, 
in particular, of the communications of the Syr-Darya with Aulie-
Ata ... The border line (pogranichnaia liniia) will have to be drawn 
beyond Chimkent. It is possible that we will find between Chimkent 
and Tashkent some sort of mountain spur (otrog gor) or watershed 
(vodorazdel’) that will always be better as a border than the course of 
a river, particularly such an insignificant river as the Arys. Such a river 
cannot serve as a border, because we are obliged to control both its 
banks; without this we would not be able to preserve communications 
along the valley of the Arys with Aulie-Ata.
Where, specifically, we can place the border between Chimkent and 
Tashkent, cannot be decided from here; it would be better to leave this 
decision to Major-General Cherniaev himself on the spot. (emphasis 
in original)58
57 Proekt soedineniia Orenburgskoi i Sibiriskoi Linii. October 31, 1864 // Ibid. Doc. 
296. Pp. 170-171.
58 Zapiska Voennago Ministra. November 9, 1864 // Ibid. Doc. 307. Pp. 182-183.
justified and authorized.52 As Miliutin had predicted, by the time Duhamel 
wrote, Russian forces would have captured Chimkent in any case. The city 
fell on September 21, after a two-day siege, with Cherniaev himself lead-
ing a storming-party through a watercourse beneath the walls, according 
to Russian accounts, although the Ta’rikh-i ‘Aliquli attributed the victory 
to a clever bluff that had persuaded the Khoqandi garrison to pursue what 
they thought was a retreating enemy and abandon the protection of their 
walls.53 His confidence that his actions would be retrospectively endorsed 
was not misplaced: Duhamel supported him, writing that, “As far as the 
rewards to General Cherniaev are concerned, his achievements stand out 
from the range of our recent steppe expeditions,” while the tsar himself 
annotated the letter “A Glorious Affair” (Slavnoe Delo).54 Cherniaev was 
congratulated and received the orders of St. George 3rd Class, and St. 
Stanislaus 1st class: even Miliutin grudgingly accepted that Cherniaev had 
acted correctly in not leaving Chimkent in Khoqandi hands, because of the 
threat it posed to communications on the new Russian frontier line.55 Only 
the Foreign Ministry was unhappy, but Gorchakov inadvertently revealed 
the degree to which Russian geographical ignorance and the attempt to use 
“natural” landmarks to fix the frontier had allowed Cherniaev to exploit the 
contradictions and ambiguities in his orders: “Chimkent was made a point 
on the Arys line only because at that time we thought that this town lay on 
the right (our) side of the river.”56 Unfortunately for him, it was already 
much too late to reverse this.
In response to Cherniaev’s conquests, and their consequently improved 
knowledge of the geography and resources of the region, the War Ministry 
drew up a new project to define the Central Asian frontier, with four pos-
sible variations:
1. A line from the Syr-Darya through Suzaq, Chulaq-Qurghan, and along 
the Qara-Tau summit to Aulie-ata and Vernoe. This was dismissed because 
it would run largely though the steppe, and have the same supply problems 
as the current Syr-Darya Line.
52 Duhamel to Miliutin, September 23, 1864 // RGIM OPI. F. 208. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 11-12.
53 Terent’ev. Istoriia zavoevaniia. Vol. 1. Pp. 293-294; K. K. Abaza. Zavoevanie Turkes-
tana. St. Petersburg, 1902. Pp. 83-84; Mackenzie. Lion of Tashkent. Pp. 42-43; Ta’rikh-i 
‘Aliquli Amir-i Lashkar / Trans. P. 68 text ff75b-76a.
54 Duhamel to Miliutin, October 31, 1864 // Serebrennikov. Turkestanskii Krai: Sbornik. 
Vol. 18 (1864 g.). Part. 2. Doc. 270. P. 139.
55 Miliutin. Vospominaniia 1863-4. Pp. 517-518.
56 Memorandum by Gorchakov, October 31, 1864 // Serebrennikov. Turkestanskii Krai: 
Sbornik. Vol. 18 (1864 g.). Part. 2. Doc. 270. P. 170.
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Your lengthy silence on the subject of these sad events could have 
very undesirable consequences, and cause me some considerable dif-
ficulties. It would be easy for news of these events to have reached St. 
Petersburg through Orenburg earlier than they reached me, and that 
the War Minister could think that I am hiding from him the true state 
of affairs.61
He wrote that Cherniaev had originally presented it to him as a recon-
naissance expedition, and had no authority to attack the city “How a simple 
reconnaissance changed into the storm of a city with a population of 100,000 
is entirely incomprehensible to me.” As usual, Cherniaev had preserved 
his response together with this letter, in which he claimed that he had not 
sought new laurels, but that he was trying to drive out the Khoqandi gar-
rison from Tashkent to prevent them from regrouping and gathering a force 
that he estimated at 15,000 horsemen against his 1½ sotnias of Cossacks. 
He also claimed to have informed Duhamel of his unsuccessful assault in 
a dispatch of October 11.62 
This controversy would never be entirely settled, although Mackenzie 
concludes, probably rightly, that Cherniaev deliberately dragged his feet 
somewhat when filing his reports of the debacle, and feared that he would 
be dismissed as a result.63 Meanwhile, Miliutin’s memoirs, written forty 
years later, reveal that his irritation at Cherniaev’s unauthorized attack on 
Tashkent had not diminished with the passing of time, although he also 
made a robust defense of the need to allow local initiative to officers on a 
frontier so far removed from Russian centere of power, and added the fol-
lowing, highly revealing passage: “This reverse was especially deplorable 
because in Asia we are supported not so much through material strength, 
owing to the small numbers of our troops, as through moral authority.”64 In 
other words, Cherniaev’s principal crime was not so much the assault itself, 
as the fact that it had been unsuccessful, and here Miliutin tacitly admitted 
that a further victory would be needed to wipe out this impression of weak-
ness from the minds of “Asiatics.” This was the same logic that had led to 
the launch of V. A. Perovskii’s expedition to Khiva thirty years earlier, and 
had also prevented the Russians from retreating from their unsustainable 
61 Duhamel to Cherniaev November 12, 1864 // RGIM OPI. F. 208. Op. 1. D. 5. L. 27ob.
62 Cherniaev to Duhamel December 17, 1864 // RGIM OPI. F. 208. Op. 1. D. 5. L. 29-30.
63 Mackenzie. Lion of Tashkent. Pp. 45-47; Jamison disagrees, seeing the week’s delay 
in drawing up the report as entirely understandable: Jamison. Weakness, Expansion and 
“Disobedience”. Pp. 142-144.
64 Miliutin. Vospominaniia 1863–4. P. 518.
Miliutin had (perhaps unwittingly) put his finger on the absurdity of using 
rivers as supposedly “natural” frontiers, though one might have added to his 
purely military observations the fact that river valleys tend to be economic 
and cultural units, whose division along the watercourse that gives them life 
is bound to create anomalies. However, he had not, of course, abandoned 
the hope that a “natural” frontier in the form of a hill or watershed would 
somehow present itself naturally from the landscape – his acknowledg-
ment that Cherniaev himself would have to identify the necessary natural 
features again left substantial latitude to the man on the spot. In any case, 
events on the frontier had once again moved more rapidly than Miliutin 
had envisaged: two weeks before he wrote this note, and only a week after 
Chimkent had fallen on September 27, Cherniaev had set out with 1,500 
men on a “reconnaissance” toward Tashkent. This could be tenuously jus-
tified with reference to the long-standing Russian intention of separating 
the city from Khoqand and turning it into a vassal khanate, and rumors that 
the Amir of Bukhara was also planning to march on the city. In the longer 
term, Miliutin also seems to have thought that Tashkent presented the best 
long-term solution to the perennial supply problems suffered by Russian 
garrisons in the steppe, but he had clearly had some difficulty in persuad-
ing the Foreign Ministry to accept Cherniaev’s fait accompli at Chimkent, 
and did not want any further annexations that year.59 Once again, it was not 
the fact, but the timing that was objectionable, and this time Cherniaev did 
not have the defense of a successful action and new military laurels to fall 
back on – his attack was beaten off with heavy losses (by the standards of 
Russia’s Central Asia campaigns) of sixteen dead and sixty-two wounded. 
Terent’ev attributed this to the failure to carry out a proper reconnaissance 
of the walls beforehand, which meant that the Russians were misled by an 
intervening hillock into thinking that their bombardment had breached the 
walls, when in fact it had only damaged the upper levels.60
Cherniaev finally lost the confidence of his superiors with this first, failed 
assault on Tashkent. He preserved a letter of rebuke from Duhamel that had 
clearly wounded him, in which the latter wrote that Cherniaev appeared to 
have suppressed news of the attack, in which one of his best officers, Obukh, 
had been killed, and another, Lerkhe, seriously wounded. Cherniaev’s reports 
of October 11, 13, and 17, had not mentioned the assault, and Duhamel had 
found out about it from private letters that had reached Semipalatinsk at the 
beginning of November.
59 Mackenzie. Lion of Tashkent. Pp. 45-46.
60 Terent’ev. Istoriia zavoevaniia. Pp. 296-297.
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happen, because I took Chimkent with great difficulty and reported 
its conquest to his Majesty the Emperor. It is impossible to draw the 
border through this place. Let the frontier be at Sharabkhana.67
Sharabkhana (literally “alcohol house” or pub) was a caravanserai half-
way between Tashkent and Chimkent, which was marked on the sketch map 
drawn up for Kolpakovskii in 1864 at a junction between two roads, but 
with no river, “mountain spur” or other “natural feature” that might make it 
a suitable frontier. Like those that had followed the affair at Aq Bulaq, these 
negotiations also fell through: in a passage that (like many of those in his 
history) is redolent with a melancholy awareness of the further defeats and 
losses that awaited Khoqand at Russian hands, Mullah Muhammad Yunus 
recorded ‘Alimqul’s supposed response: “This peace agreement is of course 
a benefit for Allah’s creatures, [and would mean] tranquillity for the yurt, 
and the flowering of religion and faith. But the people of Turkistan and Fer-
ghana are extremely ignorant, stupid and warlike, with rude temperament, 
and are unable to tell harm from benefit.”68 If they agreed to it, he added, 
then he and Mullah Muhammad Yunus would be accused of thinking only 
of their own benefit, and leaving many Muslims in the hands of the Rus-
sians. Mullah Muhammad Yunus’s bitter regret at this outcome (assuming 
his account is reliable), was probably misplaced, as there is every reason to 
doubt Cherniaev’s sincerity in these negotiations. He had not accepted his 
reverse before Tashkent in October 1864, and toward the end of January 
wrote to his old friend, Poltoratskii, urging the latter to come to Turkestan:
[W]hen you arrive here, then you will be able to confirm on the 
spot that the attack on Tashkent was not so senseless, as all my friends 
sought to present it in St. Petersburg. If there had not been instructions 
[to the contrary], then I would now drive out the Khoqandis from this 
small town with its 200,000 population [sic], in response to ‘Alimqul’s 
attack on the outskirts of Turkestan.69
Miliutin meanwhile gave Cherniaev orders not to undertake anything 
against Tashkent until he received reinforcements, but to sustain relations 
67 Ta’rikh-i ‘Aliquli Amir-i Lashkar / Trans. P. 72, text ff. 72b-73a.
68 Ta’rikh-i ‘Aliquli Amir-i Lashkar / Trans. Pp. 73-74, text ff. 85b-86a; this calls into 
question Jamison’s suggestion that ‘Alimqul was “fanatical” and simply unwilling to 
make peace and give up so many subjects and so much territory, although Mullah Mu-
hammad Yunus’s account was written much later with a good deal of hindsight. Jamison. 
Weakness, Expansion and “Disobedience”. P. 164.
69 Cherniaev to Poltoratskii, January 22, 1865; Serebrennikov. Turkestanskii Krai: Sbornik 
(1865 g.). Part. 1. Doc. 25. P. 33.
position on the Syr-Darya in the late 1850s.65 The need to maintain prestige, 
and the fear of appearing weak before both their Asian opponents and their 
European rivals would always be the deciding argument when the Russians 
were debating whether or not to advance in Central Asia.
IV
After the famous “Iqan affair: of December 3–5, 1864, during which a 
single sotnia of Ural Cossacks under Esaul Serov held off a much larger 
Khoqandi force (the Russians estimated it at 10,000) under ‘Alimqul’s 
command,66 Russian campaigning came to a halt, awaiting better weather. 
While Cherniaev complained of boredom, the Khoqandis seem to have 
interpreted this lull somewhat differently, and they once again opened 
negotiations with the Russians to try to fix a new frontier. This episode 
is not mentioned in Terent’ev or in Serebrennikov’s collection of docu-
ments, but as Mullah Muhammad Yunus described it the suggestion came 
from him, and at a guess the negotiations must have taken place in late 
December, perhaps two weeks or so after the Iqan affair. He first opened 
correspondence with Cherniaev, and then sent two merchants called Mul-
lah ‘Abd as-Sa‘id Hajji and Muhammad Karim Bek to Cherniaev, who 
was initially annoyed because he believed that the Khoqandis had been 
blocking trade between Chimkent and Tashkent. Tashkandi replied that 
this was because Cherniaev had failed to allow the Qazaqs of the Jappas 
clan, who acted as carriers for the Tashkent merchants, from coming to 
Tashkent. This misunderstanding underscored the need to normalize rela-
tions along the impromptu frontier:
Finally, after neighbourly and friendly relations had sprung up 
between us by means of our correspondence, I wrote: “If thanks to 
us peace is concluded between two padishahs, it will be of benefit 
and profit for all the creatures of Allah. It would be good if at first the 
frontier was established and demarcated.” Cherniaev replied: “If you 
wish by establishing the frontier to get Chimkent back, it will never 
65 Alexander Morrison. Twin Imperial Disasters. The Invasions of Khiva and Afghanistan 
in the Russian and British Official Mind, 1839–1842 // Modern Asian Studies. 2014. Vol. 
48. No. 1. Pp. 282-286; Morrison. “Nechto Eroticheskoe”.
66 Cherniaev to Miliutin, December 27, 1864 // Serebrennikov. Sbornik (1864 g.). Part 2. 
Doc. 396. Pp. 279-283; K. Delo Ural’tsev pod Turkestanom // Voennyi Sbornik. 1865. 
No. 4. Pp. 115-124; Mikhail Khoroshkhin. Geroiskii podvig Ural’tsev. Delo pod Ikanom 
4, 5 i 6 dekabria 1864 goda. Ural’sk, 1895; Terent’ev. Istoriia zavoevaniia. Pp. 298-305; 
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Cherniaev to arrange a meeting for him with the Khan of Khoqand and the 
Amir of Bukhara, unintentionally revealing his lack of understanding of the 
situation on the frontier). His letter concluded, however, with a significant 
injunction regarding Tashkent, passing on the instructions of the Foreign 
Ministry:
As for Tashkent, I beg your Excellency vigilantly and closely to 
observe everything that occurs in this town, and to assist the moral 
party that wishes to separate from hostile Khoqand and through your 
actions to direct the formation from Tashkent of a polity, independent 
from Khoqand and Bukhara, but a vassal of Russia.74
David Mackenzie has noted the ambiguity of these instructions, which 
did not explicitly forbid an attack on Tashkent, and Matthew Jamison has 
argued that this order constituted an open invitation, or at the very least an 
excuse, for Cherniaev to attack Tashkent once he felt his forces were strong 
enough.75 It is certainly hard to see how he could have been expected to bring 
the city within the Russian sphere of influence, or create an independent 
Khanate out of it without first attacking the city and expelling its Khoqandi 
garrison. Cherniaev continued to send reports saying that the “Russian party” 
in Tashkent was prepared to give up the city if the Russians approached with 
a military force, although Mullah ‘Alimqul had strictly forbidden commu-
nications, and there was another group that favoured Bukhara.76 On April 
23, he replied to Kryzhanovskii’s message from two months previously in 
rather bitter language:
Regarding the permanent state frontier (postoiannoi gosudarstven-
noi granitsy) with Khoqand, I have the honor to submit that, in our 
current relations with this khanate, the carrying out of a provisional 
frontier is clearly impossible, and the existence of such a frontier in 
the future would not give us any guarantee that the Khoqandis would 
not breach it during their raids. In order to repel the latter it is essential 
that peace and order be introduced into the khanate, and this in turn 
will be possible only with the establishment of our solid influence in 
the khanate itself. As far as the actual border is concerned, I cannot 
give any indications on this subject, as the map of Khoqand is entirely 
74 Kryzhanovskii to Cherniaev, February 25, 1865// Ibid. Doc. 63. P. 88.
75 Mackenzie. Lion of Tashkent. P. 54; Jamison. Weakness, Expansion and “Disobedi-
ence”. Pp. 171-174, 176-178.
76 Military Commander of the Orenburg Region to the Military Commander of Western 
Siberia, March 17, 1865 // Serebrennikov. Turkestanskii Krai: Sbornik (1865 g.). Part 
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with its inhabitants.70 This maintained a certain ambiguity in the messages 
making their way slowly from Orenburg to Cherniaev in Chimkent, hinting 
that the capture of Tashkent did fall into future plans for the new frontier, 
and also that Cherniaev should continue to try to draw the city out of Kho-
qand’s orbit. 
Meanwhile, on January 25, yet another special committee had met in 
St. Petersburg to decide the question of the administration and frontiers of 
“the Orenburg region and Asiatic Russia” and resolved to unite the territory 
“from the western limit of Issyk-Qul to the Aral Sea” into a new Turkestan 
Oblast.71 On February 12, 1865, a Prikaz from the War Ministry confirmed 
the tsar’s agreement to this. The new oblast comprised almost all the terri-
tory conquered by the Russians in Central Asia since 1847; Cherniaev was 
to administer it, but was still subordinate to Orenburg, where from February 
9, N. A. Kryzhanovskii replaced A. P. Bezak as the new governor.72 Among 
the first instructions Kryzhanovskii received was a lengthy memorandum 
from Gorchakov, setting out the Foreign Ministry’s views on Russia’s posi-
tion in Central Asia. This once again reiterated the need for a “firm, fixed 
state border” (prochnoi, nepodvizhnoi gosudarstvennoi granitsy) in Central 
Asia, but also noted:
It is essential to add a few specific considerations regarding Tash-
kent, as our closest neighbor, which will doubtless play a significant role 
for us in political and trade relations. We have decided not to include 
this town within the empire, because we consider it incomparably 
more beneficial to limit ourselves to indirect influence over it, which 
is very real thanks to the proximity of our military forces. However, 
it would be much more advantageous for us if Tashkent succeeded in 
separating itself from Khoqand and constituted itself once more as an 
independent realm … with the restoration of its previous independence, 
this town would serve as an excellent tool in the event of a necessity 
to act against Khoqand, and in part against Bukhara.73
 On February 25, Kryzhanovskii sent Cherniaev a summary of this 
document in the form of a list of requests and instructions whose faintly 
patronizing tone can hardly have failed to rile the latter, and noted that 
he intended to visit Turkestan himself before the end of August (he asked 
70 Miliutin to Bezak, February 2, 1865 // Ibid. Doc. 38. P. 49.
71 Zhurnal Komiteta, rassmatrivavshago vopros ob ustroistve Orenb. kraia i Aziatskoi 
Rossii, January 25, 1865 // Ibid. Doc. 30. P. 37.
72 Prikaz Voennogo Ministra, February 2, 1865 // Ibid. Doc. 47. P. 59.
73 Gorchakov to Kryzhanovskii, February, 23, 1865 // Ibid. Doc. 60. P. 83.
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the Khoqandis were not conducted in good faith; there were opportunities 
in 1864 to draw up a peace treaty that might have been recognized by both 
sides, but these were rebuffed because Russian decisions in Orenburg and 
St. Petersburg were made without reference to Khoqand, whose territorial 
and other claims were dismissed as inherently illegitimate. When Cherniaev 
was on the spot he entered into direct negotiations, partly perhaps to buy 
time for his forces to rest and resupply, but he was simultaneously urging 
on his superiors the danger posed first by Chimkent and then by Tashkent 
as long as they remained under Khoqandi control. 
The fall of Tashkent did not provide the Russians with the “natural 
frontier” they desired either. While it solved their immediate supply prob-
lems on the Syr-Darya, it also helped to provoke the Amir of Bukhara into 
declaring war, once again impelled at least in part by religious agitation that 
the Russian advance had provoked among the ‘ulama and the wider popu-
lation of the emirate.80 By August 1865 Cherniaev had obtained grudging 
permission from A. M. Gorchakov to establish a Russian outpost south of 
Tashkent on the Syr-Darya at Chinaz, and after initial skepticism his supe-
rior, Kryzhanovskii, would agree that Tashkent itself could not live from 
its own resources.81 From there D. I. Romanovskii used similar arguments 
to justify the capture of Khujand in 1866. Ultimately, of course, the notion 
that the landscape itself would signal to the Russians the location of a “natu-
ral” frontier where they should halt their advance was a fallacy. Instead it 
would be determined by diplomatic factors, notably the Empire’s relations 
with Britain, Iran, and Afghanistan, which in the 1880s and 1890s led to a 
final demarcation following the line of the Amu-Darya in the East, and a 
largely arbitrary, trigonometrically determined boundary in the West. Even 
then, many Russian officers would continue to hanker after the watershed 
of the Hindu Kush as the truly “natural” frontier to the Empire’s expansion 
in Central Asia.
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unknown to us, and any suggestions in this case would be founded 
solely on speculations, which very often differ from reality.77
This last phrase might be taken as emblematic of all Russian attempts to 
fix their frontier in Central Asia during these turbulent few years. Cherniaev’s 
irritation was palpable, but what he did not acknowledge was how much 
freedom of action this ignorance and ambiguity had given him. Within less 
than a week of dispatching this letter, Cherniaev had set off toward Tash-
kent with 9 ½ companies of infantry and 12 guns, ostensibly on another 
reconnaissance, but in fact with a clear intention of capturing the city once 
and for all. Various sources attest that Kryzhanovskii’s request not to make 
any move before his proposed arrival in Turkestan in the summer helped to 
prompt this, as Cherniaev did not wish to share his glory with anyone else.78 
The next time he wrote to his nominal superior, on May 2, Cherniaev was 
at Niyazbek, where he had cut off Tashkent’s water supply from the River 
Chirchik.79 The Russian frontier was about to move forward once again, 
and once again on Cherniaev’s initiative: it would be wrong, however, to 
suppose that had it not been for his ambition, Tashkent might have escaped 
Russian rule altogether. Frustration with supposed Khoqandi insolence, the 
official aim of creating a vassal khanate from the city, and Kryzhanovskii’s 
own ambitions for military glory would, sooner or later, have ensured a 
Russian assault. Cherniaev determined the timetable, but not the general 
direction of Russian policy. 
V
Clearly, the belief that a “natural” boundary would present itself between 
Aulie-Ata and Turkestan, combined with Russian ignorance of the geography 
of the region, played directly into Cherniaev’s hands. He could quite legiti-
mately argue that the orders he had received, which simultaneously told him 
to capture Chimkent and not to advance beyond the line of the River Arys, 
were wholly contradictory, and thus exploit them as he saw fit. It is also 
clear that Miliutin accepted the geographical logic of Cherniaev’s decision 
to advance beyond the Arys – namely, that it was too shallow to constitute 
a “natural” frontier, and that, in any case, military security demanded that 
the Russians control both banks. Furthermore, Russian negotiations with 
77 Cherniaev to Kryzhanovskii, April 23, 1865 // Ibid. Doc. 98. Pp. 138-139.
78 Terent’ev. Istoriia zavoevaniia. Pp. 307-308; Mackenzie. Lion of Tashkent. Pp. 54-55.
79 Cherniaev to Kryzhanovskii, May 2, 1865 // Serebrennikov. Turkestanskii Krai: Sbornik. 
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ставления обнаруживаются в инструкциях сверху Черняеву и прочим 
“деятелям на местах”. Однако, недостаток географических знаний 
о регионе предопределил противоречивость инструкций и даже их 
нереализуемость. Именно нечеткость поступавших сверху указаний 
стимулировала Черняева к самостоятельному планированию графика 
наступления (но не его направления), в соответствии с которым в июне 
1865 года пал Ташкент.    
SUMMARY
Russian expansion into Central Asia in the 19th century is usually seen 
either as the product of lobbying by big capitalist interests in Moscow, or 
as a wholly unplanned process driven by ‘men on the spot’ who slipped 
beyond St Petersburg’s control. This article is a micro-study of one of 
the campaigns which immediately preceded the fall of Tashkent in 1865, 
during which Russian forces under General M. G. Cherniaev united the 
Orenburg and Siberian ‘lines’ of fortification to create what was meant to 
be a permanent new frontier on the steppe. It demonstrates that neither of 
these explanations is satisfactory – economic calculations played a minor 
role in Russian decision-making, while there was an authorised plan for 
expansion in the region. However this plan rested on the premise that the 
Russians could identify a ‘natural’ frontier in the region, marked by a river, 
watershed or mountain range. The instructions given to Cherniaev and 
other ‘men on the spot’ reflected this, but a lack of detailed geographical 
knowledge meant that these orders were often contradictory or impossible 
to fulfil. It was this which allowed Cherniaev to determine the timetable 
(though not the direction) of Russian expansion, and would see the fall of 
Tashkent in June 1865.
Резюме
Обычно российская экспансия в Среднюю Азию в XIX веке рассма-
тривается как результат лоббирования крупных московских капитали-
стических кругов, либо как совершенно стихийный процесс, двигате-
лями которого были местные деятели, ускользавшие из-под контроля 
Петербурга. Настоящая статья представляет собой микро-исследование 
одной из военных кампаний, непосредственно предшествовавших 
падению Ташкента в 1865 году. В ходе это кампании российские силы 
под командованием генерала М. Г. Черняева соединили Оренбургскую 
и Сибирскую оборонительные линии с целью создания постоянной 
степной границы. Исследование выявило неадекватность принятых 
объяснительных моделей: экономические соображения играли мини-
мальную роль в решениях, принимавшихся российской стороной. В 
тоже время, не существовало и никого официально одобренного плана 
продвижения в регионе. Решения участников кампании основывались 
на представлении о наличии там “естественной границы”, которая бы 
обозначалась рекой, неким водоразделом или горной цепью. Эти пред-
